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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

Case No. 940574-CA

v.

:

Priority No. 2

WALLACE DAVIS,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

:

PETITION FOR REHEARING
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
Should this Court limit the scope of its ruling to
indicate that it resolves the narrow issue of whether the
forfeiture of a conveyance pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 58-3713(1)(e) (1994) amounts to punishment for double jeopardy
purposes in cases where the defendant was merely in "simple
possession" of a controlled substance?
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The language of any provisions, statutes or rules upon
which the State relies is included in the body of this petition.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS
For purposes of this petition, this Court's statement
of the case and facts is sufficient.
Utah Adv. Rep. 18 (Utah App. 1995).

See State v. Davis. 273
(A copy of this Court's

opinion is attached hereto as addendum A.)

ARGUMENT
THE STATE URGES THIS COURT TO EXPRESSLY LIMIT
THE SCOPE OF ITS OPINION TO THOSE CASES
INVOLVING FORFEITURE OF CONVEYANCES BASED ON
A PERSON'S BEING IN "SIMPLE POSSESSION" OF A
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE
In footnote 13 of its opinion, this Court indicated the
following:
We note that this holding is limited to the
narrow issue before us: whether the
forfeiture of a conveyance pursuant to § 5837-13(1) (e) amounts to punishment for double
jeopardy purposes. We do not reach the issue
of whether the forfeiture of property of a
different
character,
such as criminal
proceeds, or of a privilege, such as
operating a motor vehicle, constitutes
punishment for double jeopardy purposes.
Davis, 273 Utah Adv. Rep. at 14 n.13 (emphasis added).
At oral argument, the State asked this Court to limit
the scope of its ruling to make clear that the issues of whether
the forfeiture of instrumentalities of a crime, forfeiture of
criminal proceeds, and revocation of privileges voluntarily
granted by the State constitute punishment for double jeopardy
purposes remained open under its opinion.

Based on the content

and thrust of footnote 13, it appears the Court intended to limit
the scope of its ruling as the State had requested.
Section 58-37-13(1) (e), however, speaks in broad terms.
It provides for the forfeiture of conveyances "used or intended
for use, to transport, or in any manner facilitate the
transportation, sale, receipt, [or] simple possession [of a
controlled substance] .If Conveyances used to facilitate the sale
of a controlled substance are of a "different character" than the
2

vehicle that was forfeited in the instant case because such
conveyances may be properly treated as an instrumentality of a
crime.

Because the State believes this Court intended to

withhold judgment on the issue of whether the forfeiture of such
property constitutes punishment for double jeopardy purposes
until that issue is squarely presented to the Court, the State
asks this Court to modify its opinion accordingly.

Specifically,

the State asks the Court to amend its opinion to indicate that
its holding is limited to the narrow issue of whether the
forfeiture of a conveyance pursuant to § 58-37-13(1)(e) for cases
involving the simple possession of controlled substances amounts
to punishment for double jeopardy purposes.
CONCLUSION
The State respectfully asks that this Court narrow the
scope of its holding to indicate that it resolves the narrow
issue of whether the forfeiture of a conveyance pursuant to § 5837-13 (1) (e) based on the simple possession of a controlled
substance amounts to punishment for double jeopardy purposes.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this vj*^day of October, 1995.

JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

TODD A. UTZINGER
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Appeals Division
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EN THE
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Wallace DAVIS,
Defendant and Appellant.
No. 940574-CA
FILED: September 21, 1995
Third District, Salt Lake County
The Honorable J. Dennis Frederick
ATTORNEYS:
G. Fred Metos, Salt Lake City, for Appellant
Todd A. Utzinger and Jan Graham, Salt Lake
City, for Appellee
Before Judges Onne, Davis, and Bench.
This opinion is subject to revision before
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
D A M S , Associate Presiding Judge:
Defendant Wallace Davis pursues this
interlocutory appeal from the trial court's denial
of his motion to dismiss the charge of unlawful
possession of a controlled substance, a third
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1994). The premise of
defendant's interlocutory appeal is that he was
previously subjected to a trial regarding the
forfeiture of his vehicle, the basis of which was
the same offense alleged in the criminal
information. Therefore, if defendant were
compelled to stand trial on the criminal charges,
it would amount to a second punishment, which
is prohibited by the Double Jeopardy Clause of
the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and Article I, section 12 of the
Utah Constitution. We reverse.

CodfC
Provo, Uta

court ordered the vehicle forfeited, concludin
that the forfeiture was not violative of th
Excessive Fines Clause2 of the Eight
Amendment to the Federal Constitution.
The criminal information was filed on Apr.
12, 1994. Defendant moved to dismiss th
criminal charges, claiming that any furthe
prosecution would violate the Double Jeopard
Clause of both the United States and Uta
Constitutions. The trial court denied defendant
motion, concluding the forfeiture penalty is n<
so "disproportionate to the cost of investigatin
and prosecuting the defendant that it constitute
'punishment' rather than 'rough reinedi;
justice'" and thus "does not violate the doubl
jeopardy provisions of the United States or Uta
constitutions," citing United Stares v. Halpei
490 U.S. 435, 109 S. Ct. 1892 (1989).3
Defendant filed a petition in this cou
requesting permission to file an interlocutoi
appeal based on the trial court's denial c
defendant's motion to dismiss.4 We grante
defendant's petition.
ISSUES
The narrow issues on appeal are (1) whetht
the forfeiture proceedings and the crimin
proceedings in the case at bar are separate an<
if so, (2) whether a civil in rem forfeitu
proceeding constitutes a punishment whic
would preclude a second punishment in
criminal proceeding under the Double Jeoparc
Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Unite
States Constitution. 5
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We are charged with reviewing the correctne
of the trial court's decision to deny defendant
motion to dismiss. In doing so, we mu
determine whether the trial court correct
interpreted
the
Federal
Constitutio
Constitutional interpretation is a question of la
which we review for correctness, giving I
deference to the trial court's conclusion. State
Contrel. 886 P.2d 107, 111 (Utah App. 1994
cert, denied, No. 950059 (Utah May 9, 1995
See also Financial Bancorp, Inc. v. Pingree
Dahle, Inc., 880 P.2d 14, 16 (Utah App. 1994

ANALYSIS
It is well established that the Fif
Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause protec
a defendant from three abuses: "a secoi
prosecution for the same offense after acquire
a second prosecution for the same offense aft
conviction; and multiple punishments for t
same offense." United States v. Halper, 4'
U.S. 435, 440, 109 S. Ct. 1892, 1897 (198<
It is the third abuse, multiple punishments f
the same offense, which is at issue hei
Although the government may impose multip
punishments against a defendant in the sar
proceeding, it may not do so in two or mo
separate proceedings. United
States
$405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 121
1215 (9th Cir. 1994), amended by 56 F.3d •
UTAH ADVA! ZE REPORTS

FACTS
The facts are not in dispute. On January 13,
1994, defendant was stopped by a West Valley
City police officer for a. motor vehicle license
violation. While performing a routine check, the
officer discovered defendant had outstanding
warrants and, therefore, placed him under
arrest. As a result of the arrest, defendant's
vehicle was impounded and searched. The
search uncovered one-quarter gram of cocaine,
which had a value of approximately $25.
Defendant's vehicle was ultimately seized and
held for forfeiture pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§58-37-13(l)(e) (1994).1 Defendant filed a
claim, seeking the vehicle's return. At the
forfeiture trial held May 11, 1994, the trial
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1994).6
The Second and Eleventh Circuits, on the
other hand, have concluded that a civil forfeiture
proceeding and a parallel criminal action can
constitute a single proceeding against the
defendant. See United States v. 18775 North Ba\
Road, Miami, 13 F.3d 1493, 1499 (11th Cir'.
Separate Proceedings
Because the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits 1994); United States v. Millan, 2 F.3d 17, 20
punishing a defendant more than once in (2nd Cir. 1993), cert, denied, _ U.S. _ , 114
separate proceedings, we must first determine S. Ct. 922 (1994). In Teaching its decision in
whether the forfeiture proceedings in this case Millan, the court relied on the following: (1) the
are separate from the criminal proceedings "warrants for the civil seizures and criminal
arrests were issued on the same day, by the
initiated against defendant.
The federal circuit courts have approached this same judge, based on the same affidavit!;]" (2)
issue differently. The Seventh and Ninth Circuits | a stipulation entered into by the government and
have concluded that civil forfeiture proceedings the defendants included both the property in the
are separate from criminal proceedings. United civil forfeiture and the property in the criminal
(3)
the
civil
complaint
States v. Torres, 28 F.3d 1463, 1465 (7th Cir.), indictment;
cert, denied, _ _ U . S . _ , 115 S. Ct. 669 (1994); cross-referenced and incorporated the criminal
United States v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 indictment; and (4) the defendants knew at the
F.3d 1210, 1216 (9th Cir. 1994). In time they agreed to the stipulation that there
$405,089.23 U.S. Currency, the government were criminal charges pending. 2 F.3d at 20.
was seeking not only criminal penalties against
The court determined that the fact that the
the defendant, but was also pursuing civil civil forfeiture and the criminal action were filed
forfeiture remedies. The different actions were separately was of no relevance; noting that in
instituted at roughly the same time, but the the federal system, civil and criminal actions
forfeiture proceedings were before a different were required to be filed separately. Id.
judge and were not concluded until over a year "Therefore, courts must look past the procedural
after the criminal convictions. Additionally, the requirements and examine the essence of the
forfeiture complaint was based on exactly the actions at hand by determining when, how, and
same offenses giving rise to the criminal why the civil and criminal actions were
prosecution. "[T]he only difference between the initiated." Id. Thus, the court determined that
two proceedings was the remedy sought by the the actions were the result of a single
government." 33 F.3d at 1216.
coordinated effort against the defendants and
The issue before the court was parallel to the therefore were a single coordinated prosecution,
issue before this court: Whether the second thereby avoiding double jeopardy issues. But see
proceeding was a violation of the defendant's United States v. Ursery, 59 F.3d 568, 575 (6th
Fifth Amendment Double Jeopardy rights. In Cir. 1995) (stating that merely labeling
concluding that the criminal action and the something as a "'single, coordinated proceeding'
forfeiture action were separate proceedings for . . . does not make it so").
double jeopardy purposes, the court staled:
The apparent inconsistencies between the
We fail to see how two separate actions, one
Ninth and Second Circuits' approaches may
civil and one criminal, instituted at different
depend more upon factual and procedural
times, tried at different times before
differences in the cases than fundamental
different factfinders, presided over by
differences in a double jeopardy analysis. The
different district judges, and resolved by
Nmth Circuit approach is more mechanical and
separate judgments, constitute the same
literal, providing a more practical and utilitarian
"proceeding." In ordinary legal parlance,
methodology of avoiding potential double
such actions are often characterized as
jeopardy challenges. The Second Circuit
"parallel proceedings," but not as the "same
approach, on the other hand, focuses upon a
proceeding." A forfeiture case and a
more detailed analysis of the synchronization of
criminal prosecution would constitute the
the two proceedings, together with the
same proceeding only if they were brought
defendant's involvement at various stages cf
in the same indictment and tried at the same
those proceedings, to determine whether the
time.
defendant has been twice placed in jeopardy.
Id. Moreover, although both proceedings Thus, parallel proceedings which are literally
resulted from the same violation of the law, the separate, may, under certain circumstances, not
court stated, "We are not willing to whitewash be separate for double jeopardy purposes. 7
the double jeopardy violation in this case by
In the case at bar, the State has brought and
affording constitutional significance to the label tried the civil forfeiture proceeding separately
of 'single, coordinated prosecution/" Id. at from the criminal prosecution. The actions were
1217. See also Torres, 28 F.3d at 1465 ("Two initiated separately and the State seeks to try the
trials, even if close in time, are still double actions at different times before different judges,
jeopardy."); United States v. Stanwood, 872 F. which will result in separate judgments against
Supp. 791 (D. Or. 1994); United States v. defendant. Warrants were not issued on the
McCaslin, 863 F. Supp. 1299 (W.D. Wash. I same day by the same judge based on the same
UTAH AD VAN :E REPORTS
(9th Cir. 1995). Thus, we must address two
questions: (1) Is the forfeiture proceeding
separate from the criminal prosecution?; and, if
so, (2) Does the forfeiture in this case amount to
a punishment for double jeopardy purposes?

20
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affidavit for either the civil forfeiture or the
criminal action. There was no stipulation entered
into by defendant which referenced property
contained in both the civil and criminal action,
and the civil forfeiture complaint did not
incorporate the criminal information. The only
coinciding factor between the two cases is that
they are based on the same offense. This alone
is insufficient to support a determination that the
proceedings are the same, even under the
Second Circuit's analysis. Under the Ninth
Circuit's analysis, the proceedings herein were
clearly separate because "[a] forfeiture case and
a criminal prosecution would constitute the same
proceeding only if they were brought . . . and
tried at the same time." $405,089.23 U.S.
Currency, 33 F.3d at 1216. Accordingly, under
either analysis, the proceedings in the case at
bar are separate for double jeopardy purposes.8
Punishment
Because we have concluded that the
proceedings in the case at bar are separate, we
must next determine whether the forfeiture of
defendant's vehicle is punishment for double
jeopardy purposes. The State asserts, and the
trial court agreed, that the forfeiture of
defendant's vehicle did not constitute punishment
because the value of the vehicle was not
disproportionate to the cost of prosecuting
defendant. Defendant claims that when
determining whether a forfeiture is punitive in
nature, we should look to the forfeiture statute
itself to determine whether any purpose of the
statute or result of its application is to punish the
offender. Although the forfeiture statute may be
deemed to serve some remedial objective, such
as reimbursing the government for the cost of
prosecution, defendant argues that if it cannot be
interpreted as solely remedial, but can also be
said to act as a deterrent or serve some other
punitive purpose, then it must be considered
punishment for double jeopardy purposes.
The issue of whether a civil in rem forfeiture
conducted pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§58-37-13 (1994) constitutes punishment has
been recently addressed by the Utah Supreme
Court. In State v. 392 South 600 East, Nephi,
Utah, 886 P.2d 534 (1994), the court concluded
that section 58-37-13(l)(i) "is punitive, at least
in part."9 Id. at 541. The basis for the court's
decision paralleled that of Austin v. United
States, _ V.S. _ , 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993).
In Austin, the petitioner was indicted on four
counts of violating South Dakota's drug laws
and ultimately pled guilty to only one count; he
was subsequently sentenced to a seven-year
prison term by the state court. After the
petitioner'8 indictment, the federal government
instituted in rem proceedings in the federal
district court pursuant to 21 U.S.C. §§881(a)(4)
and (a)(7),10 seeking forfeiture of the petitioner's
mobile home and auto body shop. In granting
summary judgment in favor of the government,
the district court rejected the petitioner's Eighth
Amendment excessive fines argument. The
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summary judgment was upheld on appeal to the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. The case was
then taken before the United States Supreme
Court.
In concluding that a forfeiture pursuant to 21
U.S.C. §881 (a)(4) and (a)(7) amounted to
punishment, the Supreme Court focused on: (1)
the historical significance of the fact that civil in
rem forfeitures were always understood to be
punitive in nature; (2) the innocent owner
defense afforded the property's owner under
section 881(a)(4) and (a)(7); (3) the fact that
forfeitures under section 881 are strictly
associated with drug violations; and (4) the
legislative history of section 881. n Austin, 113
S. Ct. at 2810-11. The government's arguments
that the statute was remedial in nature because it
"remove[s] the 'instruments' of the drug trade
'thereby protecting the community from the
threat of continued drug dealing,'" id. at 2811
(quoting Brief for United States at 32), and
because it reimburses the government for the
expense of law enforcement and "societal
problems such as urban blight, drug addiction,
and other health concerns resulting from the
drug trade" were clearly rejected. Id. The Court
reasoned the petitioner's mobile home and auto
body shop could hardly be considered
instruments of the drug trade and "'[t]here is
nothing even remotely criminal in possessing'"
the properties at issue. Id. (citation omitted).
Furthermore, because "'forfeiture of property .
. . [is] a penalty that ha[s] absolutely no
correlation to any damages sustained by society
or to the cost of enforcing the law[,]'" id. at
2812 (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S.
242, 254, 100 S. Ct. 2636, 2644 (1980)), the
government's claim that forfeitures under section
881 were a "'reasonable form of liquidated
damages'" was also rejected, id. at 2811
(quoting One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United
States, 409 U.S. 232, 237, 93 S. Ct. 489, 493
(1972)).
Even if section 881(a)(4) and (a)(7) were
remedial in part, the Court opined, they would
still conclude that the forfeiture was punitive
because "4a civil sanction that cannot fairly be
said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but
rather can only be explained as also serving
either retributive or deterrent purposes, is
punishment, as we have come to understand the
term.'" Id. at 2812 (quoting United States v.
Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448, 109 S. Ct. 1892,
1902 (1989) (eniphasis ad<ied)). Thus, even if a
statute is remedial in part, if it has any punitive
attributes, constitutional protections attach. Id.
Because the Court found that forfeiture pursuant
to section 881(a)(4) and' (a)(7) amounted to
punishment, the constraints of the Eighth
Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause applied.
The State attempts to distinguish the holding in
Austin on two grounds: (1) Austin misinterprets
and therefore misapplies the test for punishment
set forth in Halper and extracts a "rule" from
Halper which is merely dicta; and (2) Austin
applies only in the Eighth Amendment context.

UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS
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However, the State's reasoning is flawed for sentences seem to conflict with each other. In
the first instance, the Court states that a civil
several reasons.
The State asks this court to ignore the test for sanction is punishment if it is not solely
punishment announced in Halper, 490 U.S. at remedial, but is also retributive or deterring in
448, 109 S. Ct. at 1902, and underscored in nature. The second sentence states that if a civil
Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2812, claiming that the sanction cannot be identified as remedial, but
language is merely dicta. Although there may only as deterring or retributive in nature, then it
have been some confusion created by the holding is punishment. The State claims that the
in Halper,
Austin
has clarified
any difference between the two is of great
importance, and that the second sentence is the
misunderstanding.
In Halper, the defendant was criminally "true" test for determining whether a civil
convicted of violating the federal criminal sanction is punishment.
false-claims statute when be submitted sixty-five
We need not resolve this issue because Austin
false
claims for M e d i c a r e
benefits clarifies any potential confusion created b>
reimbursement, amounting to S585. Based on Halper when it, again, defines punishment for a
the facts established by the criminal conviction, constitutional protection analysis by focusing on
the government attempted to collect a civil the first sentence of the Halper definition. Austin
penalty for the crime pursuant to the False states that
Claims Act (the Act), which provided for a civil
[w]e need not exclude the possibility that a
penalty in the amount of $2000 per false claim,
forfeiture serves remedial purposes to
for a total of $130,000, plus the costs of
conclude that it is subject to the limitations
prosecution and twice the amount of the actual
of the Excessive Fines Clause. We,
damages. The United States District Court for
however, must determine that it can only be
the Southern District of New York, however,
explained as serving in part to punish. We
concluded that the civil penalty under the Act
said in Halper that "a civil sanction that
would amount to a second punishment,
cannot fairly be said solely to serve a
considering the disproportionality of the penalty
remedial purpose, but rather can only be
to the actual costs to the government, and held
explained as also serving either retributive
it violative of the Double Jeopardy Clause. On
or deterrent purposes, is punishment, as we
appeal, the United States Supreme Court
have come to understand the term." Halper,
addressed the issue of "whether and under what
490 U.S. at 448, 109 S. Ct. at 1902.
circumstances a civil penalty may constitute Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2806 (emphasis added).
'punishment' for the purposes of double Furthermore, because the statute in Austin could
jeopardy analysis." Halper, 490 U.S. at 436, not be fairly assessed as serving solely a
109 S. Ct. at 1895.
remedial function, it was considered punishment
The Court declined to base its decision on the for constitutional purposes. Id. at 2812. Thus,
statutory language of the Act, concluding that a Austin distinctly emphasizes that even if criminal
statutory construction analysis "is not well suited fines, civil penalties, or civil forfeitures have
to the context of the * humane interests' remedial purposes, if they have any punitive
safeguarded by the Double Jeopardy Clause's objectives, they are subject to constitutional
proscription of multiple punishments." Id. at constraints. Id.
447, 109 S. Ct. at 1901. Instead, "the
Austin's interpretation of punishment flows
determination whether a given civil sanction logically when considered in the double jeopardy
constitutes punishment in the relevant sense context. As the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
requires a particularized assessment of the stated:
penalty imposed and the purposes that the
fTJhat a sanction should be considered
penalty may fairly be said to serve." i2 Id. at
punishment if it is not solely remedial is
448, 109 S. Ct. at 1901.
supported by common sense. That is to say,
A definition of punishment was set forth by
if a particular remedial sanction can only be
the Court which may have led to the existing
understood as also serving punitive goals,
confusion:
then the person subjected to the sanction has
IAJ civil sanction that cannot fairly be said
been punished despite the fact that the
solely to strvt a remedial purpose, but
sanction is also remedial. To conclude
rather can only be explained as also serving
otherwise effectively invalidates the Double
either retributive or deterrent purposes, is
Jeopardy Cuius e by allowing multiple
punishment, as we have come to understand
punishments for the same conduct merely
the term. [Citation omitted.] We therefore
because the punishments also serve remedial
hold that under the Double Jeopard} Clause
purposes.
a defendant who already has been punished
United States v. Hudson, 14 F.3d 536, 540
in a criminal prosecution may not be
(10th Cir. 1994) (emphasis added).
subjected to an additional civil sanction to
Accordingly, we reject the State's contention
the extent that the second sanction may not
that Austin misinterpreted the test for
fairly be characterized as remedial, but only
punishment set forth in Halper.
as a deterrent or retribution.
The State also claims the analysis in Austin
Id. at 4 4 8 ^ 9 , 109 S. Ct. at 1902. The State does not apply to the Fifth Amendment Double
correctly observes that the above quoted Jeopardy Clause because the holding defines
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS
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punishment for Eighth Amendment Excessive rem forfeiture statute which has historically been
Fines purposes only. We disagree. In understood to constitute punishment. See State v.
determining whether the Eighth Amendment One 1983 Pontiac (Joe Arave), 111 P.2d 1338,
protections applied, the Austin court undertook 1340 (Utah 1986) ("We affirm that the major
a punishment analysis first, and only then did it thrust of [Utah Code Ann. §58-37-13] is to
determine that Eighth Amendment protections strike at those involved in the trafficking of
applied. Furthermore, Austin used the "solely drugs"); State v. $9,199.00 U.S. Currency, 791
remedial" portion of the test employed by P.2d 213, 215 (Utah App. 1990) (same). Like
Halper, a double jeopardy case, in determining subsection (l)(i), subsection (l)(e) contains an
whether section 881 constituted punishment for innocent owner defense. Thus, because the claim
Eighth Amendment purposes. Austin, 113 S. Ct that forfeiture constitutes nothing more than
at 2812. Thus, the same analysis for punishment liquidated damages to reimburse the state for the
is undertaken whether a defendant is seeking cost of prosecution has already been repudiated,
protection under the Eighth Amendment's it is clear that a forfeiture under section
constitutes
punishment.13
Excessive Fines Clause or the Fifth 58-37-13(l)(e)
Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause. See Furthermore, even though 392 South 600 East
United States v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 was an Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines
F.3d 1210, 1219 n.8 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating, case, with respect to determining whether
"the answer to the question whether a particular forfeiture constitutes punishment, we hold that it
forfeiture constitutes punishment will always be makes no difference whether the analysis applies
the same for purposes of the Double Jeopardy to the Fifth or Eighth Amendment, even though
Clause and the Eighth Amendment"): cf. the end result may be different because of other
14
Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch,
U.S. aspects of a given case. Accordingly, the
_ , 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1945 (1994) (stating civil constitutional protections afforded by the Fifth
15
penalties and civil forfeitures are "subject to Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause apply.
The State claims that the forfeiture in this case
constitutional constraints").
Notwithstanding the State's position that the is constitutional because the value of the vehicle
holding m Austin is not applicable to the case at (between $2925 and $4600) was rationally
hand, the Utah Supreme Court was "persuaded related to the cost to prosecute defendant in both
that the analysis m Austin applies equally to the forfeiture action and the criminal
section 58-37-13(l)(i)." 392 South 600 East, proceedings. Because the value of the forfeiture
Nephi, Utah, 886 P.2d at 540. In 392 South 600 is not "so disproportionate to the damages
East, the defendant was arrested after he caused," Halper, 490 U.S. at 450, 109 S. Ct. at
purchased marijuana at his own residence from 1903, the State asserts it should not constitute
an informant for the Juab County Sheriffs punishment. This approach was explicitly
office, and the State subsequently instituted rejected in Austin, which recognized that Halper
forfeiture proceedings against the defendant's "focused on whether 'the sanction as applied in
residence and real property under section the individual case serves the goals of
58-37-13(l)(i). The defendant resisted, claiming punishment/" but stated "(i]n this case,
that the forfeiture violated the Eighth however, it makes sense to focus on §§881 (a)(4)
and (a)(7) as a whole." Austin. 113 S. Ct. at
Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause.
2812
n.14
(citation
omitted).
Austin
After explaining Austin in detail, the court
distinguished the civil sanction at issue in Halper
applied the same analysis to the issue before it.
from the forfeiture issue before it:
The Utah Supreme Court reiterated that
Halper involved a small, fixed penalty
forfeiture statutes in general have always been
provision, which "in the ordinary case . . .
punitive in nature, and recognized that,
can be said to do no more than make the
analogous to section 881(a)(4) and (a)(7), section
Government whole." [Citation omitted.] The
58-37-13(l)(i) has an innocent-owner defense.
value of conveyances and real property
Therefore, based on these two factors and the
forfeitable under §§881(a)(4) and (a)(7), on
fact that the United States Supreme Court
the other hand, can vary so dramatically that
rejected the claim "that forfeiture is a reasonable
any relationship between the Government's
liquidated compensation to the state," the court
actual costs and the amount of the sanction
concluded that section 58-37-13(1 )(i) "is
is merely coincidental.
punitive, at least in part." Id. at 541. Because
Id. Thus, when addressing civil forfeitures,
forfeiting property pursuant to section
Austin concludes that the cost of prosecution
58-37-13(l)(i) is considered a punishment, the
compared to the value of the forfeiture is
court held that the Eighth Amendment's
irrelevant.
Excessive Fines Clause applied. Id.
We follow the rationale set out in Austin and
Although the forfeiture proceedings in 392
South 600 East were brought pursuant to reject the "disproportionality" test as advanced
subsection (l)(i) of section 58-37-13, the same by the State. As identified in Austin, utilizing a
analysts is applicable to subsection (l)(e), which "disproportionality" test when addressing
is at issue here. Section 58-37-13(l)(e) provides forfeiture creates inconsistent results and further
for the forfeiture of a conveyance when it is complicates criminal proceedings. The public
used in connection with illegal controlled interest is best served when a potential defendant
substances. Thus, subsection (\)(t) is a civil in is put on notice of what his or her conceivable
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punishment is for his or her crime.
Furthermore, by looking solely to the purpose
behind the forfeiture statute as opposed to
comparing the cost of prosecution to the value of
the forfeited conveyance on a case by case basis,
the necessity of extensive fact finding is
eliminated. The interests of the public are also
served by analyzing the nature of the statute to
determine whether it is solely remedial or partly
punitive as well as providing a utilitarian
framework within which to pursue criminal
defendants, eliminating the speculative nature of
the "disproporiionaljty" test.
Moreover, the disproportionaliry test would
frequently result in an unacceptable inequality of
treatment. Forfeiture of an essentially valueless
automobile would not constitute punishment
because its value would not exceed the costs of
prosecution; forfeiture of a valuable automobile
would constitute punishment in the many
situations where the vehicle's value greatly
exceeded the cost of prosecution. But the poor
person's loss of his only "wheels" may actually
work much more of a hardship than the wealthy
person's loss of a luxury automobile. Surely the
availability
of
important
constitutional
protections cannot turn on such vagaries of
economics. Cf. Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2812 n.14
("[T]he value of the conveyances. . . forfeitable
. . . can vary so dramatically that any
relationship between the Government's actual
costs and the amount of the sanction is merely
coincidental.").
CONCLUSION
We hold that the concluded forfeiture action
and the pending criminal proceeding are separate
proceedings for double jeopardy purposes and
that a forfeiture pursuant to section 58-37-13
constitutes punishment. By pursuing the criminal
proceedings against defendant, the State is
attempting to punish defendant a second time for
an offense for which he has already been
punished, the very abuse that the Double
Jeopardy Clause protects against. Therefore, we
conclude thai the subsequent criminal proceeding
is barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause of the
Fifth Amendment. Accordingly, the trial court's
order denying defendant's motion to dismiss is
reversed.'6
James Z. Davis. Associate Presiding Judge
I CONCUR:
Gregory K. Orme, Presiding Judge

1. Utah Code Ann. §58-37-13 (1994), in pertinent
part, provides:
(1) The following are subject to forfeiture and no
property right exists in them:
(e) all conveyances including aircraft, vehicles,
or vessels used or intended for use, to transport,
or in any manner facilitate the transportation,
sale, receipt, simple possession, or concealment
of property described in Subsections (l)(a) and
(l)(b), except that:
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(ii) a conveyance may not be forfeited under
this section by reason of any act or omission
committed or omitted without the owner*s
knowledge or consent . . . .
(9) . . . (h) Proceedings of this section arc
independent of any other proceedings, whether
civil or criminal, under this chapter or the laws
of this state.
Id.
2. The Excessive Fines Clause provides that
unreasonable fines shall not be imposed. Thus,
defendant argued the forfeiture of his vehicle was
excessive when considered in light of his crime
Defendant did not appeal the forfeiture judgment.
3. The "blue book" value of the vehicle was between
$2925 and $4600. The parties have stipulated that the
cost to prosecute both the forfeiture case and the
pending criminal case is approximately $2500.
4. The State has stipulated to defendant's request for
interlocutory review.
5. Defendant also advances a state constitutional
analysis, claiming the Double Jeopardy Clause of the
Utah Constitution should be interpreted differently
than the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause.
Defendant claims this court "should hold that in rem
forfeiture constitutes punishment" and that "in rem
forfeiture constitutes a separate proceeding" for
purposes of our state constitution's Double Jeopardy
Clause. However, "[a]s a general rule, we will not
engage in state constitutional analysis unless an
argument for different analyses under the state and
federal constitutions is briefed." State v. Lqfferry, 749
P.2d 1239, 1247 n.5 (Utah 1988) (emphasis added).
cert, denied, 504 U.S. 911, 112 S. Ct. 1942 (1992).
Accord State v. Shilling, 770 P.2d 137, 142 n.26
(Utah 1989). Defendant is essentially asking this court
to interpret the Double Jeopardy Clause under our
state constitution in the same manner as the Double
Jeopardy Clause under the Federal Constitution.
Hence, a state constitutional analysis is unnecessary
and this court declines to undertake that task.
6. The United States Supreme Court alludes to this
issue in Department of Revenue v Kurth Ranch,
U.S. __ ? 114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994). In that case, the
defendants were arrested and charged criminally for
conspiracy to possess drugs with the intent to sell in
violation of Montana law. In addition to the criminal
charges, the State instituted both a civil forfeiture
action to recover certain property used in defendants'
drug operation and an administrative proceeding
involving the assessment of a "drug tax" on the
confiscated drugs. The dispositive issue in Kurth
Ranch involved the States attempt to impose a tax on
the drugs pursuant to its new Dangerous Drug Tax
Act. The Court ultimately held that the tax was
punishment for double jeopardy analysis. Id. at 1948.
More importantly, the Court noted "the statute [does
notj require us to comment on the permissibility of
'multiple punishments' imposed in the same
proceeding, since it involves separate sanctions
imposed in successive proceedings * Id at 1947 n.21
(citation omitted). Thus, the Court considered the
cnminaj indictment and the tax assessment
proceedings to be separate proceedings, even though
they arose out of the same offense and were the result
of a single coordinated effort by the government to
cease the defendants drug operation. Even though the
language in Kurth Ranch is dicta, it is instructive for
our purposes.
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7. The Sixth Circuit recently melded the Second and
Ninth Circuits' analyses to hold that separate
proceedings occurred where a civil forfeiture consent
judgment was entered during the pendency of criminal
proceedings. United States v. Urserx, 59 F.3d 568,
575 (6th Cir. 1995).
8. Not only does federal case law compel the
conclusion that the proceedings in the case at bar are
separate, but the forfeiture statute itself provides that
"[proceedings of this section are independent of any
other proceedings, whether civil or criminal, under
this chapter or the laws of this state." Utah Code Ann.
§58-37-13(9)(h) (1994). See also Utah Code Ann.
§76-3-501 (6)(h) (1994) (providing vehicle is subject to
forfeiture when used in the commission of a felony
where a firearm is used and that any forfeiture
proceedings are "independent of any other
proceedings, whether civil or criminal"); Id. §58-378(8)(a) ("Any penalty imposed for [the illegal
possession of a controlled substance] is in addition to,
and not in lieu of, any civil or administrative penalty
or sanction authorized by law.").
9. Utah Code Ann. §58-37-13(1)0)0994) provides
for the forfeiture of
all warehousing, housing, and storage facilities,
or interest in real property of any kind used, or
intended for use, in producing, cultivating,
warehousing,
storing, protecting,
or
manufacturing any controlled substances in
violation of this chapter
....
Id.
10. 21 U.S.C.A. §881(a) provides for the forfeiture
of:
(4) All conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles,
or vessels, which are used, or are intended for
use, to transport, or in any manner to facilitate
the transportation, sale, receipt, possession, or
concealment of [controlled substances) . . . .
(7) All real property, including ?ny right, title.
and interest (including any leasehold interest) in
the whole of any lot or tract of land and any
appurtenances or improvements, which is used,
or intended to he used, in any manner or pan, to
commit, or to facilitate the commission of, a
violation of this subchapter punishable by more
than one vear's imprisonment . . .
21 U.S.C.A. §881 (West Supp. 1995). It should be
noted that subsection (4) is essentially identical to
Utah Code Ann. §58-37- 13(l)(e) (1994). which is at
issue in this case
11. Congress identified forfeiture as "'« powerful
deterrent*" and stated that "'the traditional criminal
sanctions of fines and imprisonment are inadequate to
deter or punish the enormously profitable trade in
dangerous drugs.*' Austin, 113 S. Ct. at 2811
(quotingS. Rep. No. 225 at 191, 195(1983)).
12. The Court cautioned, however, that the analysis
was not from the defendant's perspective because "for
the defendant even remedial sanctions carry the sting
of punishment." Halper, 490 U.S. at 447. 109 S Ct.
at 1901 n.7.
13. We note that this holding is limited to the narrow
issue before us: whether the forfeiture of a
conveyance pursuant to
§58-37-13i 1 )(e) amounts to
punishment for double jeopardy purposes We do not
reach the issue of whether the forfeiture of property of
a different character, such as criminal proceeds, or of
a privilege, such as operating a motor vehicle,
constitutes punishment for double jeopardy purposes.
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14. As the Ninth Circuit properly stated:
To make it clear, we hold only that because the
method of determining whether the forfeiture
constitutes punishment is identical, the answer to
the question whether a particular forfeiture
constitutes punishment will always be the same
for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause and
the Eighth Amendment. [However], [wjhether a
violation of either clause exists involves factors
that are different with respect to each clause.
U.S. v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210,
1219 n.8 (9th Cir. 1994).
15. Most courts from other jurisdictions hold that the
Austin analysis applies in the Fifth Amendment
context. See People v. Towns, 646N.E.2d 1366, 1370
(III. Ct. App. 1995) and cases cited therein; see also
State v. 1979 Cadillac Deville, 632 So. 2d 1221, 1228
(La. Ct. App. 2 Cir.), writ granted, 642 So. 2d 1302
(La. 1994) ("Although not specifically deciding a
double jeopardy claim in Austin, the Court's reasoning
makes it clear that double jeopardy applies in
[forfeiture cases]"). Contra State v. Johnson, 632 So.
2d 817, 818 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir.), writ granted.
642 So. 2d 1302 (La. 1994) (rejecting Austin analysis
for Halper "disproportionate" test—civil forfeiture not
so disproportionate to government's damages to
constitute punishment). See also Fant v. State, 881
S.W.2d 830, 834 (Tex. Ct. App. 14th Dist. 1994)
(holding prior civil forfeiture constitutes punishment
under Double Jeopardy Clause so as to prohibit
subsequent criminal proceedings), rejecting Johnson v.
State, 882 S.W.2d 17, 20 (Tex. Ct. App 1st Dist.
1994) (holding forfeiture did not implicate double
jeopardy because it was not "'overwhelmingly
disproportionate to the damages appellant caused'")
(citation omitted); State v. Clark, 875 P.2d 613,617
(Wash. 1994) (stating "the Austin Court's reasoning
for deeming forfeiture 'punishment' for the purpose »•:"
Eighth Amendment analysis extends to the Fifth
Amendment as well").
16. We find nothing inherently unconstitutional about
forfeiture and stress that double jeopardy is implicated
only when remedies for criminal activity are sought in
separate proceedings. To the extent that Utah Code
Ann. §58-37-13(9)(h)(1994) may or may not impede
the pursuit of remedies in the same actual proceeding,
that is a matter that must be addressed by our
legislature.
B E N C H , J u d g e (dissenting):
I respectfully dissent. The main opinion errs
by concluding, as a matter of law, that criminal
prosecution of defendant would violate double
jeopardy because defendant has already been
subjected to the civil forfeiture provision of Utah
Code Ann. §58-37-13 (1994).
The Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides, in pertinent part, that no
person shall "be subject for the same offence to
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb|.]"
Historically, this provision was interpreted to
apply in cases where a person's life was at stake
or to "offences which, in former ages, were
punishable by dismemberment, and as intending
to comprise the crimes denominated in the law.
felonies." People v. Goodwin,
3 8 Johns. 187,
201 ( N . Y . 1820). Most courts now accept the
notion that, despite the narrow constitutional
language, double jeopardy bars multiple criminal
prosecutions ana punishments for the same
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^criminal offense regardless of the severity of the that double jeopardy applies to civil forfeiture
^offense and consequent punishment. Breed v. under section 58-37-13. The main opinion
Jones,A21 U.S. 519,528,95 S. Ct. 1779,1785 compounds this error by importing Eighth
Amendment principles into a Fifth Amendment
(1975).
,,:The main opinion, however, goes far beyond analysis.
The Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth
what the United States Supreme Court has ever
«aid about double jeopardy and holds that a civil Amendment is the protection available to
sanction is subject to double jeopardy analysis if criminal defendants against unreasonable civil
U.S.
, 113 S. Ct.
it is not solely remedial. The main opinion states forfeiture. See Austin,
that if the civil sanction has any punitive at 2803 (holding that Excessive Fines Clause
aspects, no matter how minor, double jeopardy applies to forfeitures of property used to
applies. The main opinion misreads the manufacture or transport illegal drugs); 392
Constitution and misapplies the holding of South 600 East, Nephi, Utah, 886 P.2d at
United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 109 S. 540-41 (same). Under the Eighth Amendment,
there is no bright line test for determining when
Ct. 1892 (1989).
In Halper, the Supreme Court expressly held a forfeiture is constitutionally excessive. See 392
South 600 East, Nephi, Utah, 886 P.2d at 541.
as follows:
Instead, trial courts are granted appropriate
We therefore hold that under the Double
discretion to determine, under the specific facts
Jeopardy Clause a defendant who already
of each case, when a civil forfeiture becomes
has been punished in a criminal prosecution
constitutionally excessive. Id.
may not be subjected to an additional civil
sanction to the extent that the second
Even if the proportionality analysis under the
sanction may not fairly be characterized as
Eighth Amendment could be fairly imported into
a double jeopardy case, the main opinion fails to
remedial, but only as a deterrent or
afford the trial court the necessary discretion to
retribution.
Id. at 448^9, 109 S. Ct. at 1902 (emphasis decide the case. The United States Supreme
added). Therefore, if the civil sanction can be Court has recognized the imprecise task of
characterized as serving at least some remedial determining the punitive character of a civil
purpose, double jeopardy does not apply. Id.; sanction:
We acknowledge that this inquiry will not
accord Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch,
be an exact pursuit. In our decided cases we
U.S.
, 114 S. Ct. 1937, 1945 (1994)
have noted that the precise amount of the
(holding that double jeopardy applies only if
Government's damages and costs may prove
"the sanction may not be fairly characterized as
to be difficult, if not impossible, to
remedial, but only as a deterrent or
ascertain. . . . Similarly, it would be
retribution").1
difficult if not impossible in many cases for
In the present case, section 58-37-13 provides
a court to determine the precise doDar figure
for forfeiture, under certain enumerated
at which a civil sanction has accomplished
circumstances, of property used to manufacture
its remedial purpose of making the
or transport controlled substances. This section
Government whole, but beyond which the
is at least partially remedial in nature. In State
sanction takes on the quality of punishment.
v. 392 South 600 East, Nephi, Utah, 886 P.2d
In other words, as we have observed . . .
534, 541 (Utah 1994), the Utah Supreme Court
the process of affixing a sanction that
stated that this section is also "punitive, at least
compensates the Government for all its costs
in part." In so stating, the supreme court
inevitably involves an element of rough
recognized that this section serves at least some
justice. Our upholding reasonable liquidated
remedial purpose. Id. (^forfeiture statutes
damages clauses reflects this unavoidable
historically have been understood as serving not
imprecision. Similarly, we have recognized
simply remedial goals but also those of
t h a t in t h e o r d i n a r y
case
punishment and deterrence.'" (quoting Austin v.
fixed-penalty-plus-damages provisions can
United States,
U.S.
, n.14, 113 S. Ct.
be said to do no more than make
2801, 2803 n.14 (1993)).
Government whole.
Under Halpefs Fifth Amendment analysis,
double jeopardy applies only when the statute in Halper, 490 U.S. at 449, 109 S. Ct. at 1902.
question is solely punitive in nature. Halper, The Court indicated that it would continue to
490 U.S. 448-49, 109 S. Ct. 1902. By contrast, look with favor upon such reasonable liquidated
under Eighth Amendment analysis, the damages clauses and "fixed-penalty-plusExcessive Fines Clause applies if the statute m damages" provisions. The Court noted that it
question is merely partly punitive in nature. was the rare case where a fixed-penalty
Austin,
U.S.
, 113 S. Ct. at 2806 provision subjects an offender to a sanction
(holding that "[w]e need not exclude the overwhelmingly disproportionate to the
possibility that a forfeiture serves remedial damages. Id.
The rule is one of reason: Where a
purposes to conclude that it is subject to the
defendant previously has sustained a
limitations of the Excessive Fines Clause. We,
criminal penalty and the civil penalty sought
however, must determine that it can only be
in the subsequent proceeding bears no
explained as serving in part to punish.")
rational relation to the goal of compensating
Therefore, the main opinion errs by concluding
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the Government for its loss, but rather
appears to qualify as "punishment" in the
plain meaning of the word, then the
defendant is entitled to an accounting of the
Government's damages and costs to
determine if the penalty sought in fact
constitutes a second punishment.
Id. 109 S. Ct. at 1902. Because of the imprecise
nature of this determination, the Court left
individual determinations of when civil sanctions
constitute punishment within the sound
discretion of the trial court.
We must leave to the trial court the
discretion to determine on the basis of such
an accounting the size of the civil sanction
the Government may receive without
crossing the line between remedy and
punishment.
Id.
In the present case, the trial court concluded
that
the penalty suffered by the defendant in the
forfeiture proceeding did not exceed what
could reasonably be regarded as the
equivalent compensation, for the state[']s
loss, and the penalty is not entirely
unrelated to the actual damages suffered.
The forfeiture penalty assessed in the
forfeiture action was not so disproportionate
to the cost of investigating and prosecuting
the defendant that it constitutes
"punishment" rather than "rough remedial
justice."
The trial court therefore held that the seizure of
defendant's vehicle did not constitute
"punishment" in the constitutional sense. This
determination by the trial court is entitled to
significant deference. See Halper, 490 U.S. at
449-50, 109 S. Ct. 1902.
Recently, the Utah Supreme Court addressed
the deference due a trial court in cases where
the court is called upon to apply facts to the
law. In State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 938 (Utah
1994), the supreme court held that trial courts
are entitled to deference when applying facts to
controlling law. Unless the trial court crosses an
established legal boundary, we should not upset
the court's determination of whether, under the
specific facts of a given case, the value of
property seized under section 58-37-13 is so
disproportionate to the cost of investigation and
prosecution to constitute "punishment." Id.
The trial court in the instant case did not
abuse its discretion in determining that the
State's seizure of defendant's vehicle did not
constitute "punishment." Therefore, even if
double jeopardy applies in this case, the main
opinion errs by substituting its judgment for that
of the trial court.

58-37-13, a defendant's redress is limited to the
Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth
Amendment. In any event, the trial court did not
abuse its discretion by determining that the
seizure of defendant's vehicle was roughly
equivalent to the cost of prosecution and
therefore was not "punishment" in the
constitutional sense.
I would therefore affirm the trial court's
denial of defendant's motion to dismiss the
criminal charge brought against him.
Russell W. Bench, Judge
1. Justice O'Conner, writing separately in Kurth
Ranch, echoed the principle of Halper: "Our double
jeopardy cases make clear that a civil sanction will be
considered punishment to the extent that it serves only
the purposes of retribution and deterrence, as opposed
to furthering any nonpunitive objective." Kurth
Ranch,
U.S.
, 114 S. Ct. at 1953.

CONCLUSION
Section 58-37-13 is not, as a matter of law,
solely punitive. The Double Jeopardy Clause
therefore should not even come into play.
Because the protections of double jeopardy are
not available to a defendant under section
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